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Abstract 
The role of informal networks in the development of regional clusters has recently received a lot of 
attention in the literature. Informal contact between employees in different firms is claimed to be 
one of the main carriers of knowledge between firms in a cluster. This paper examines empirically 
the role of informal contacts in a specific cluster. In a questionnaire survey, we asked a sample of 
engineers in a regional cluster of wireless communication firms in Northern Denmark a series of 
questions on informal networks. We analyze whether the engineers actually acquire valuable 
knowledge through these networks. We find that the engineers do share even quite valuable 
knowledge with informal contacts. This shows that informal contacts represent an important 
channel of knowledge diffusion. 
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1 Introduction 
Many researchers have provided detailed studies of clusters with high performing innovative 
capabilities over the last ten years or so. Often, clusters have been closely connected to leading-
edge universities in the business area of the cluster. Researchers who have studied Italian industrial 
districts (Russo, 1985; Brusco, 1990; Pyke et al., 1990) have argued that one of the explanations for 
the geographical concentration of innovative activities is that knowledge developed in a cluster or 
industrial district flows more easily within it, but more slowly outside and across its borders. One of 
the explanatory factors cited is that informal networks of contacts emerge between individuals 
across firm boundaries, and act as channels of knowledge flow. These channels of communication, 
it is argued, facilitate knowledge diffusion, giving firms located in clusters certain advantages 
regarding innovative performance. Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of these 
channels for the existence of clusters, with Saxenian (1994) being one of the most cited examples. 
Similarly, authors of econometric studies of the geography of innovation (many of which are 
reviewed by Feldman (1999)), have frequently claimed that localized knowledge spillovers (LKS) 
of this kind are the main reason for the geographical concentration of innovative activity.  
Knowledge spillover through informal contacts is just one of the externalities that are argued to 
be the main forces behind industrial clustering. From the classical work of Alfred Marshall (1890), 
Krugman (1991) derives three kinds of externality that are important for clustering: (i) economies of 
specialization caused by a concentration of firms being able to attract and support specialized 
suppliers, (ii) economies of labour pooling, where the existence of a labour force with particular 
knowledge and skills attracts firms, which in turn attract and create more specialized labour, and 
(iii) technological externalities or knowledge spillover (LKS), where knowledge and information 
flow more easily between actors located in a cluster than over long distances. 
In his effort to integrate the geographical dimension into mainstream economic theory, Krugman 
(1991) dismissed the role of LKS by claiming that although they may exist in some high-tech 
industries, they are not an important force for agglomeration. Instead, our focus should be directed 
towards more measurable externalities, such as economies of specialization and labour pooling. 
Krugman’s claim has fuelled an intense, and sometimes heated, discussion within the community of 
economic and industrial geographers (see Martin and Sunley (1996) and Martin (1999) for 
examples of this debate) and among other scholars, as illustrated by the critical quotations in Jaffe 
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et al. (1993) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996). In an effort to dismiss Krugman on this point, 
Martin (1999) claims that empirical studies of the geography of innovation provide clear evidence 
that LKS plays an important role in the clustering of economic activity. However, these studies 
have been criticized by Breschi and Lissoni (2001a), who argue that the concept of LKS is no more 
than a ‘black-box’ with ambiguous content. In particular, they argue that this literature fails to 
distinguish between local knowledge flows that take the form of public goods and those that do not. 
They suggest that in order to shed light on this issue, it is necessary to study in detail how 
knowledge is actually transferred between individuals and firms located in the same geographical 
area. 
The next section of the paper presents a review of the theoretical ideas that have been dominant 
in the debate about the role of informal knowledge exchange through personal contacts. Informal 
knowledge exchange is an example of a channel of knowledge spillover or Marshallian 
technological externalities. Consequently, we look only at those contributions that have considered 
this as an isolated empirical and theoretical phenomenon. These theories may possibly have 
contributed to the creation of the myth that clusters are driven by intense disclosure of detailed 
knowledge between firms. This myth has spread to the above-mentioned literature on clusters and 
the geography of innovation. In this paper, the dominant theories are confronted with an alternative 
view, which has criticized the proposed role of informal contacts in clusters by arguing that they are 
used to disclose only very general information and ideas of minor importance. The role of the 
present paper is to confront these two views in an empirical investigation of the extent of informal 
networks and their role as channels of knowledge diffusion. 
To study the importance and extent of informal networks in clusters, we use the results from a 
recent questionnaire study of the communications cluster in Northern Denmark (NorCOM). The 
discovery of NorCOM by Gelsing and Brændgaard (1988) relied on the same arguments for the 
existence of this cluster as are found in the dominant literature. They argued that informal personal 
networks are intensive between the employees, who carry knowledge through the cluster. Later, 
Dalum (1993) stated that the employees have strong personal relations and that there are many 
relations of a cooperative, as well as a competitive, nature. This helped to establish the dominant 
local view that the informal networks within the cluster were one of the main reasons for its fast 
growth in the 1990s. 
This paper examines informal networks of contacts between employees in NorCOM and 
assesses whether these networks act as channels of valuable and specific knowledge exchange 
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between firms. Unlike previous studies (also of NorCOM), the present analysis is carried out at the 
micro level, in this case focusing on the engineer. Such a focus provides a better picture of the 
informal network of contacts, which constitutes one advantage of the present paper. Previous 
studies have, for example, been based on interviews with the managers of the firms, and such 
studies cannot reveal completely the extent and importance of networks. The manager then becomes 
the only representative for matters inside the firm and in relation to the behaviour of the employees. 
The results are likely to be biased towards the manager’s personal opinion and organizational 
policy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents theories of the 
importance of knowledge diffusion through informal contacts in general and in clusters specifically. 
Section 3 builds testable propositions from the theoretical framework and describes the NorCOM 
Questionnaire Survey, on which our analysis is based. The results are presented in Section 4. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2 Knowledge Diffusion and Informal Contacts 
The ideas of collective invention (Allen, 1983) are convenient for describing the dynamics of 
knowledge diffusion through networks and clusters. Collective invention is characterized by high 
invention rates and fast knowledge accumulation created by disclosure of information between 
competing agents. It is driven by exchange and circulation of knowledge and information within 
networks formed by groups of socially connected individuals. 
Allen’s ideas were based on case studies of the blast furnace industry in Cleveland (UK) in the 
middle of the 19
th
 century, where producers shared knowledge about their furnaces that enabled 
them to discover, collectively, the positive relationship between productivity and the height of the 
furnace (Allen, 1983). Since then, other historical case studies have confirmed Allen’s ideas, for 
instance McGaw’s (1987) study of the mechanization of chapter manufacture in the Berkshire area 
(New England) from the beginning of the 19
th 
century. Another example is Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff’s (2000) study of the American glass industry from 1870 to 1925. These cases seem to be 
geographically bounded and thus relevant for general cluster theory. More recent developments of 
regional clusters, such as Silicon Valley, where rapid technological development is combined with a 
relatively open diffusion of knowledge (Saxenian, 1994), and the Italian examples of industrial 
districts (Russo, 1985), provide modern examples of collective invention. 
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Two aspects of collective invention are worthy of particular note (Cowan and Jonard, 2000). 
First, participation in the type of community mentioned requires a high level of technical 
knowledge and skill, which is needed to contribute to, and to take advantage of, developments 
within the communities. Second, reputation is very important, because the provision of information 
is motivated primarily by an expectation of reciprocity. 
Although the idea of collective invention is appealing, it is primarily relevant to industries where 
firms do not spend substantial amounts on the development of new knowledge. In these cases it is 
profitable to release technical information and knowledge, since it is expensive and almost 
impossible to exclude others from the developments (Allen, 1983). 
When similar firms are located in clusters (or industrial district-like environments), firms share a 
common set of values and knowledge so important that they form a cultural environment. In this 
environment, firms are linked by specific informal relations in a complex mix of cooperation and 
competition (Brusco, 1990). Saxenian (1994), when comparing the regional agglomerations in 
Silicon Valley and Route 128, points to certain disparities with regard to the creation and character 
of networks. In Silicon Valley, informal contact between individuals is important, mutually 
beneficial, and widely observed. With a culture that supports informal relationships and a variety of 
regional institutions that provide network services by arranging trade fairs, conferences, seminars, 
and social activities, the individuals (co-workers, competitors, former co-workers, suppliers, 
customers etc.) meet each other often, which results in the formation of relationships and informal 
contacts. These are maintained and strengthened by ongoing activities. Technical and market 
information is exchanged, because the Silicon Valley culture allows them to discuss details of their 
work. In the Route 128 case, informal contacts are few and the culture discourages networking, and 
the exchange of knowledge and problems. The extent of informal activity in Silicon Valley is 
perhaps unusual, but the level of interaction and information flow in combination with a rapid 
technological development is important for theories of clusters in general. 
The existing literature (e.g. Rogers, 1982; Von Hippel, 1987; Schrader, 1991) suggests that 
knowledge diffusion through informal channels occurs in the form of information trading. This type 
of informal exchange of knowledge between firms is a frequently observed phenomenon in product 
development, production, and the diffusion of technological innovations (see Martilla, 1971; Allen, 
1984; Czepiel, 1974). Information trading refers to the informal exchange of information between 
employees working for different, and sometimes competing, firms (Von Hippel, 1987). Colleagues 
in different firms provide each other with technical advice, expecting that the provision of 
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information will be reciprocated in the future. For instance, an employee in the production process 
might solve unforeseen technical problems by communicating with a colleague in a competing firm 
that uses the same production equipment. The colleague in the other firm has to decide whether to 
provide him with the information. If it creates disadvantages for his firm, he might want to keep it. 
Otherwise, he would disclose it with a future reciprocity in mind (Schrader, 1991). 
The transfer of knowledge represents a potential cost for the transferring firm. Competitive 
advantage decreases as the value of the knowledge transferred increases (Allen, 1984). In other 
words, the transfer of knowledge influences the firm’s valuation of a particular piece of 
information. Schrader (1991) points to three factors influencing these expectations. First, the rents 
that the firm can expect to gain from a given piece of information are influenced by the degree of 
competition. If the firm transfers to a non-competing firm, the change in rent is likely to be zero, 
unless the other firm transfers this information to another competing firm. In addition, if the two 
firms have different competitive goals, the receiving firm might gain the benefit without the 
transferring firm losing rent (see also Hamel et al., 1989). Second, the availability of alternative 
sources of information has an effect on rent expectations, which depend on the time span for which 
the owner has an advantage relative to the acquirer of the information. Similar knowledge and 
information can often be acquired from other sources, such as suppliers or competitors. 
Consequently, the competitive advantage of a piece of information can be lost even if the 
transferring firm refuses to transfer it to the receiver. Third, rents are affected by whether the 
information relates to a domain in which the two firms compete. Firms are likely to compete along 
many dimensions, such as price, quality and consumer services. The decrease in rent expectations 
may differ between these. 
On the other hand, firms might also receive rent benefits from transmitting information or 
knowledge. Studies by Von Hippel (1987) and Rogers (1982) show that the transfer of knowledge is 
part of a relationship based on mutual exchange. Schrader (1991) points to two different 
approaches. One approach assumes that the partners are interested in continuing the relationship. A 
firm would weaken the relationship if it did not return a favour, which would prevent it from 
gaining rents from knowledge received in the future. The other approach builds on the possible 
social aspects of exchange relationships. The lack of willingness to return a favour may induce 
feelings of guilt and a poor reputation. It is generally agreed that receiving a benefit will increase 
the chances of the favour being returned with a similar transmission of knowledge. This depends on 
the value of the knowledge or information. The higher the benefit, the greater is the chance that it 
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will be returned. Obviously, even if the receiver is eager to return the favour, the initial transmitting 
firm gains nothing from the relationship if the receiver is unable to provide any beneficial 
knowledge. Therefore, Carter (1989) suggests that firms that trade information tend to favour 
partners that promise the most useful knowledge in return. Clearly, a firm is more interested in 
establishing relationships with another firm that is at the forefront of technological development. 
According to Maskell et al. (1998), the creation of informal networks of contacts goes through 
several phases, from relations between two individuals to entire networks. The transformation starts 
with transfer of knowledge between two individuals. Repeated interactions between the two lead to 
falling costs of future interactions through the development of routines and conventions, which 
decrease costs. This makes the relationship stable. Both vertically and horizontally, related firms 
may benefit from a climate of trust and mutual understanding. This will facilitate more informal 
contacts and interaction, at the levels of both the firm and the employee (Maskell, 2001). Maskell 
also stresses the importance of experimenting and testing different technological paths in clusters of 
horizontally related firms. They learn from the success and failure of others and are able to monitor, 
discuss, and compare other firms’ solutions. In this way, they participate in a continuous learning 
process by comparing different solutions, selecting, imitating, and adding their own ideas. 
Breschi and Lissoni (2001b) are critical of some of the ideas presented above. Building on 
detailed studies, they make two main points (our emphasis). First, knowledge sharing through 
informal contacts is not likely to involve more than the sharing of relatively small ideas, which will 
not jeopardize the originators’ rights to more strategic knowledge. Second, interpersonal 
communication is relatively more important for sharing knowledge with customers than with 
competitors
 
(Lissoni, 2001). Moreover, Schrader (1991) finds that friendships have no significant 
impact on the probability that information is traded. However, he also claims that friendship might 
define the extent of the network. Furthermore, physical proximity does not imply the existence of 
social proximity, since such epistemic communities
 
(see Cowan et al. (2000) and Steinmueller 
(2000)) never include all members of the local community. Knowledge may be far from accessible 
to most of those located nearby (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001b). Knowledge circulates in small 
epistemic communities, which are centred around single firms, rather than flowing freely within 
clusters (Lissoni, 2001). 
In analyzing the Brescia mechanical cluster, Lissoni (2001) finds that the communities consist 
of individual engineers linked by personal ties of trust and reputation. Although they arise from 
successful commercial partnerships and deals, the communities are not based on inter-firm 
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arrangements, but respect the appropriation strategies of each firm. Accordingly, Breschi and 
Lissoni (2001b) argue that there might be several competing networks of firms in a regional cluster. 
The networks are built over time with the cooperation of partners, suppliers and customers. As a 
result of long lasting inter-firm cooperation, engineers have created their own ‘codebook’ and 
specific knowledge, which cannot easily be understood by competitors. Even in epistemic 
communities that contain members from competing networks, the engineers retain their loyalty to 
the firm or network to which they belong. They exchange general, rather than specific, knowledge. 
Although regional clusters are seen as homogeneous knowledge communities, the firms still tend to 
specialize in narrow market niches with customized products. As a result, only a fraction of firm-
specific knowledge can possibly be diffused through informal contacts within a cluster (Lissoni 
2001).  
In summary, earlier theoretical contributions argue that knowledge is diffused through informal 
contacts. Across firms, colleagues provide each other with advice and solutions to problems. They 
disclose even valuable firm-specific knowledge with future favours in mind, despite the fact that 
such disclosure could be a disadvantage to the firm. However, this view has been criticized recently 
by other scholars, who argue that agents will not disclose firm-specific knowledge to external 
agents because of loyalty to the firm. They will only exchange more general knowledge of low 
value. Based on these conflicting views, two groups of propositions are developed in the next 
section. 
3 Propositions and Survey Data 
The propositions are divided into two groups according to the aims of the paper. The first deals with 
the type, extent and value of informal contacts, while the second focuses on their causes. The 
following propositions have as their basis the view that informal contacts between employees in 
different firms are an important source of knowledge for the firms. 
Propositions group 1 
When an engineer decides to share knowledge with an informal contact he/she should, ideally, 
consider whether it is in the economic interest of the firm. However, he/she will look past that 
sometimes and disclose important pieces of knowledge even if it is to the disadvantage of his/her 
firm. This type of transaction will take place because the engineers will expect to gain valuable 
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knowledge in return. The higher are the benefits at the receiving end of the exchange, the larger is 
the chance of reciprocation. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Firm-specific knowledge is exchanged through informal contacts. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Knowledge acquired through informal contacts is generally valuable to 
the receiver. 
 
The questionnaire deals with this by asking the engineer whether he/she had ever acquired 
knowledge through informal contacts that could be used in his/her own work. Afterwards the 
engineer is asked to place a value on that knowledge (high, medium or low) and to characterize it. 
Propositions group 2 
The contacts involve informal exchange relationships. They are stable over time, since the creation 
of informal contacts takes time and involves trust and frequent interaction. Over time, employees 
tend to keep in contact with former colleagues and classmates as they change jobs within a cluster. 
At first, only low-value knowledge is traded through a specific informal contact because of 
uncertainty about the relationship. However, as the number of successful transactions and the level 
of trust increase, it is possible that more valuable knowledge will be traded. Through long working 
experience, an engineer develops contacts with more people and works in different project groups 
and firms. He builds up trust and a reputation and therefore increases the number of his contacts. 
Perhaps more importantly, he increases his knowledge of who to approach for information. This 
increases the extent of informal contacts and leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Relationships between engineers persist through time. 
Hypothesis 2b: More knowledge will be shared as the employees gain experiences, 
because of stronger relationships and increased trust. 
 
In order to minimize the loss of competitive advantage from valuable knowledge, the firm wants to 
limit the possibility of employees disclosing information about their businesses to informal 
contacts. This leads to: 
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Hypothesis 2c: Firms want to reduce the extent of knowledge sharing with employees in 
other firms through informal channels, to prevent competitors from 
gaining valuable knowledge and secrets. 
 
This paper draws on data from a questionnaire survey conducted in November/December 2001. 
A questionnaire was sent to engineers in the NorCOM firms. NorCOM is the name of a formal 
organization formed by some of the firms in the wireless communications cluster in North 
Denmark. During the last two decades this cluster has emerged in North Jutland focusing on 
wireless communications equipment. The cluster is defined by a joint knowledge base, which 
includes electronic signals transmitted by radio waves. At present, 25 out of the 35 firms in the 
cluster are members of NorCOM. The questionnaire was sent to the managers of the member firms. 
Nineteen of these managers agreed to recommend to those of their employees with engineering 
degrees (including computer scientists) that they answer the questionnaire. 
The engineers are the single most important resource for research and development in the 
cluster. In almost all of the firms, they account for a high proportion of employment. After 
contacting the managers personally, we received information about the number of employees in this 
category. 791 questionnaires were sent to the 19 firms. 346 questionnaires were returned to us, 
which represents a 44 percent response rate. 
After seeking some basic information and educational background, we asked about the 
following: (i) working experience in communication technology and in different locations, (ii) 
characteristics of their present job and important parameters in the process of selection for their 
present job, (iii) reasons for job changes, (iv) contact with other employees from other firms, (v) 
contact with departments and university staff, (vi) the need for, and use of, further educational 
opportunities, (vii) the importance of, and reason for, membership/non-membership of labour 
unions, and (viii) the entrepreneurial spirit and opportunities for the establishment of firms in the 
future. 
In this paper and in the questionnaire, we define an informal contact as a person working in 
another firm (in the same cluster) with whom the engineer has a social relationship that is not part 
of a formalized agreement between the two firms. 
A survey of links in the electronics industry in North Jutland in 1988 revealed only a few formal 
links, but interviews revealed the existence of many informal links (Gelsing and Brændgaard, 
1988). This study, the first to map the relations between the firms, found a high degree of mobility 
of employees between the firms. Based on interviews, Gelsing and Brændgaard concluded that 
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although the management disapproved of informal contacts and external knowledge diffusion, there 
were well developed informal contacts between technical personnel, who knew each other’s job 
shifts and stayed in contact. Dalum (1993) confirmed this through interviews at management level: 
“… the informal personal networks (…) have been of significant importance. Below the 
level of top management there are intensive informal links between employees, even from 
firms who are competitors.”(Dalum, 1993 p. 200) 
 
With no official cooperation between firms, technical personnel borrowed test equipment and 
spare parts from each other and small technical problems were solved by telephone calls to former 
colleagues or fellow students. The knowledge diffusion had the character of trade with some 
expected reciprocity. Gelsing and Brændgaard (1988) claim that the informal contacts and 
subsequent knowledge diffusion were very important for the emergence of the cluster. 
4 Importance of Informal Contacts  
In the questionnaire survey, the sample of engineers consisted mainly of men (94%) with an 
average age of 33 years. Almost half of them were graduates from Aalborg University and their 
average work experience in the cluster was between four and five years; 62% had worked in the 
cluster for four years or less. On average, they had worked a little more than 2½ years in their 
current job and less than 25% had done so for more than three years. Their function in the firms at 
the time of the survey is described in Figure 1. They were engaged primarily in research and 
development. 
 
Figure 1 just about here 
 
The important issue for this paper is whether the engineers were members of informal personal 
networks. A majority (76%) answered that they had at least one informal contact with employees in 
other firms in the cluster. Informal contacts were, as expected, widespread, a phenomenon that is 
shown at the top of Table 1.  
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4.1 Value and specificity – Testing propositions group 1 
To investigate whether the engineers acquire any useful knowledge through informal contacts with 
employees in other firms, we look at the acquisition of knowledge both in general and with respect 
to their specific job function. The engineers are divided into two groups: those who acquire, and 
those who do not acquire, knowledge through informal contacts that they can use in their current 
job. This is shown at the bottom of Table 1. 
 
Table 1 just about here 
 
Of the engineers with informal contacts, 41% gained knowledge from them. This means that 
informal contacts do act as a channel of knowledge. Around 30% of the total sample acquired 
knowledge from their contacts that they found to be useful in their own job. In comparison, 
Schrader (1991) surveyed technical managers in the steel mill industry and found that 83% of his 
sample had provided specific technical information to a colleague in another firm at least once 
during the previous year. Schrader’s study is of the entire US steel mill industry, which is not 
geographically clustered, but his results suggest that these informal relationships across firms are 
present even across significant geographical distances. Another noticeable difference between our 
study and Schrader’s is that his questions are about whether the subjects of the study had provided 
information to a colleague in another firm, whereas we asked whether they had received 
information from contacts in other firms. This difference is potentially significant, especially when 
loyalty to one’s firm is taken into account. It would be easier to state that one had received 
information, rather than state that one had provided a contact with information. This difference in 
the construction of the questionnaire should be borne in mind when comparing our and Schrader’s 
studies. 
In a study of electronic and mechanical engineers working within four industries in the Brescia 
mechanical cluster, Lissoni (2001) found that 30% of the engineers had a relationship of some kind 
with engineers in other firms. 60% of these relationships involved technical discussions, which is 
equivalent to 18% of the total sample. This is clearly in conflict with our results, but may be due to 
differences in the two samples. The present study is of a small cluster located in a small 
geographical area, the Aalborg region, with a fairly limited number of firms with one common core 
technology, wireless communication. In contrast, Lissoni’s study has a broader industrial 
specification and firms were located across a larger geographical area. This could be why there are 
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higher shares of engineers with informal contacts and knowledge sharing in the NorCOM 
questionnaire. Another difference with similar implications concerns the characteristics of the two 
industries. There are rather large differences between the work practices and technological 
challenges in the more mature mechanical industry and the more unstable, but developing, wireless 
communication industry. The lower technological challenges could mean that engineers in the 
mechanical industry are less likely to seek information about future developments outside the firm. 
Consequently, this could also be a source of differences between the results. 
However, we still know little about what kinds of knowledge are shared through these contacts. 
The critical literature claims that this knowledge will be general and not very specific. Lissoni 
(2001) finds that 27% of the engineers’ relationships involve only asking/giving suggestions of a 
general nature and only 15% discussed current projects. His results show a lower level of 
information trading, from which he concludes that informal contacts do not go beyond the exchange 
of general information. However, again, his study is broader, as discussed above.  
Figure 2 shows how many engineers acquired different kinds of knowledge in our study. 
Figure 2 just about here 
 
Engineers acquired all kinds of knowledge through their informal contacts. General knowledge 
was diffused through this channel, with more than 80% of respondents mentioning this. However, 
more specific knowledge was also diffused, shown by the fact that more than 30% of engineers who 
acquired knowledge gained access to technical information about new products. In the bigger 
picture, this shows that 32% of all the engineers with at least one informal contact gained access to 
general knowledge from that contact. More interestingly, 12% of those engineers also acquired 
more specific knowledge on new products. Clearly, this means that informal contacts in other local 
firms cannot be neglected as a source of specific knowledge. This confirms hypothesis 1a. In this 
context it is interesting to see not only what type of knowledge is acquired, but also how this 
knowledge is of value to the receiving engineer. 
 
Figure 3 just about here 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the value of knowledge across the three categories. More than 
60% of the respondents that gained access to knowledge rated the knowledge as being of medium or 
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high value to their own work. All in all, these respondents constituted almost 20% of the total 
sample. This indicates clearly that informal contacts are important sources of knowledge and that a 
significant proportion of engineers greatly benefited from those contacts in relation to their own 
work. This confirms hypothesis 1b. Similarly, 61% of Schrader’s (1991) sample considered 
colleagues in other firms to be an important, or very important, information source and only 
colleagues in one’s own firm were considered to be more important. 
4.2 Genesis of informal contacts – Testing propositions group 2 
Table 2 shows with whom the engineers were in contact. More than half of the engineers in the 
sample had informal contact with former colleagues in the cluster. This indicates that mobility is 
important for the extension of informal contact networks. The relationships created by engineers 
working together seem to last longer than the actual time they work together. The second largest 
category is former classmates. The results confirm hypothesis 2a, since the relationships created 
over time are persistent. 
Table 2 just about here 
 
To investigate further the role of mobility in the creation of informal contacts, we examined 
whether higher mobility results in there being a higher probability of having at least one informal 
contact. However, there was no difference in the frequency of informal contact between the 
engineers with higher or lower than average mobility between firms according to Table 3. The 
results are insignificant. Although the engineers stay in contact with former colleagues, it is clear 
that above-average mobility does not increase the probability that they will have at least one 
informal contact. Changing jobs does contribute in the form of informal contacts to 66% of the 
engineers, but it does not increase the number of people with contacts. This indicates that a certain 
proportion of the respondents are not interested in, or for other reasons are reluctant to have, 
informal relationships with people outside their own firm, even though they worked with them in 
the past. Note, however, that 16% of our sample had only recently entered the labour market (within 
the last two years) and were still working in their first job. They may be less likely to have 
developed informal contacts with employees in other firms, because the probability of having at 
least one contact may well increase with experience. This is investigated in Table 4. 
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Table 3 just about here 
 
The results for industry and cluster experience are very similar. Engineers with longer working 
experience are more likely to have at least one informal contact. This is not surprising, since the 
longer they have worked in the cluster or in the industry, the more conferences they will have 
attended and the more firms they will have worked in, each of which factors increases their 
probability of having at least one contact. By contrast, the engineers with little experience have 
worked in fewer firms and met fewer people, so there is a smaller probability that they will have an 
informal contact. The proportion of more experienced engineers who place a high or average value 
on the knowledge is also larger than for the less experienced. While it cannot be confirmed that the 
engineers with more experience are more likely to acquire knowledge than those who are less 
experienced, the knowledge they acquire certainly has a higher average value to them. This 
indicates that the greater experience the engineers have, the better they are at acquiring useful 
knowledge from their contacts. They know whom they have to contact in order to acquire the 
knowledge or to help to solve their particular problem. This enables us to confirm hypothesis 2b 
only partly. 
 
Table 4 just about here 
 
Having at least one informal contact could also depend on the function for which the engineers 
are primarily responsible in the firms. Table 5 shows the job functions of the sample. Engineers 
who work primarily with management issues are most likely to have at least one informal contact, 
although the proportion for the respondents working on R&D is not much lower. For those involved 
in production, the figure is much lower. More interestingly, the table also shows that management 
and production engineers tend to have higher levels of knowledge acquisition than R&D engineers. 
 
Table 5 just about here 
 
Not only do more managers have at least one informal contact, but more of them also acquire 
knowledge from their contact(s) compared with R&D personnel. Managers are likely to have 
worked their way up the career ladder and perhaps started working as R&D engineers themselves at 
the beginning of their careers. Consequently, they have more experience than the rest of the sample; 
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they have met more people from other firms and know where to obtain the knowledge they need. 
Furthermore, as managers, they might also attend more conferences and other events, where they 
may meet employees from other firms. All this will increase their chances of having at least one 
contact and of sharing knowledge. Schrader (1991) found percentages similar to these in his study, 
which included only technical managers.  
Besides contacts arising from the above factors, the initial contact between engineers from two 
firms may be created by a formal joint project. If they work together on a specific joint project, 
there is a possibility that their relationship will last longer than the project itself. Engineers 
previously involved in formalized projects with employees from other firms in the cluster are also 
more likely to have informal contacts than engineers not previously involved, as shown in Table 6. 
It is plausible that some of the informal contacts arise directly from prior formalized projects. 
Working in a firm that has previously been engaged in a formalized project with another local firm 
increases the probability that the employees will have at least one informal contact outside his/her 
firm. 
 
Table 6 just about here 
 
According to Von Hippel (1987) and Schrader (1991), firms might discourage their employees 
or even actively try to prevent their knowledge from being shared with an outside party. The 
management culture in firms might thus have an influence on how, and to what extent, the 
employees share their knowledge with others. Firms in this cluster became increasingly interesting 
objects of acquisition for multinational corporations (MNCs) throughout the 1990s. An interview-
based study by Lorenzen and Mahnke (2002) reveals that the management culture of the MNCs has 
influenced the social networks of the acquired firms. Following the acquisition of a firm by an 
MNC, local networking is often discouraged while networking within the MNC is encouraged. 
Clearly, managerial regimes and culture can have an effect on the extent of informal relationships 
across the boundaries of firms and corporations. 
It is known publicly that some of the engineers have competition clauses of various forms 
included in their employment contracts. These clauses can, for instance, limit the employee’s 
possibility of taking a job in a competing firm or working with the same products immediately after 
ending the contract. In our sample, 16.2% of the engineers have such a competition clause in their 
contract. These clauses are used as a proxy for a firm’s actions towards limiting the disclosure of 
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knowledge to other firms through informal channels. Firms that include these clauses in the 
contracts of their employees are also more likely to have policies that prevent or discourage their 
employees from sharing the firm’s knowledge with an informal contact. Table 7 shows the relation 
between competition clauses and the probability of having at least one informal contact. 
 
Table 7 just about here 
 
The engineers that have competition clauses in their contracts are less likely to have at least one 
informal contact outside the firm. Only 63% of the respondents with a clause like this have one or 
more informal contacts. This shows that firms with restrictive managerial regimes, i.e. with 
competition clauses in the contracts, are successful at limiting informal networking between their 
employees and those in other cluster firms. This supports hypothesis 2c, since some firms are trying 
to limit the contact between their employees and other firms. 
Previously in this paper, we presented evidence that general knowledge is the type of knowledge 
that is shared the most through the networks in this cluster. Notifications about new job openings 
are frequently mentioned in the literature as an example of a more general type of knowledge. 
Below, we examine how the engineers primarily received information about their current job in 
relation to their participation in informal contacts with engineers from other firms. The primary 
channels for information about current jobs were divided into network-related factors, and non-
network-related factors, as shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 just about here 
 
Engineers with at least one informal contact made more use of network-related factors as their 
primary channel for information when changing to their current job. This shows that respondents 
with informal contact(s) use other channels to access knowledge about more general issues, such as 
new job openings, to a greater extent than those without such contacts. This is an example of the 
general knowledge or information that flows through the informal networks of contacts between 
employees and between firms in the cluster. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper describes how previous claims that knowledge is diffused through informal social 
networks have been criticized recently. Critics of these claims state that agents will not generally 
disclose firm-specific knowledge to external agents because of their loyalty to the firm. They argue 
that employees will only tend to exchange more general information of low value, which will not be 
so disadvantageous to their firms.  
The present paper shows that knowledge flows through informal contacts do take place, using as 
a basis a survey of individual engineers in the NorCOM cluster. A large proportion of the 
responding engineers acquire knowledge from their social contacts, which they rate as being of high 
or medium importance for their own work. This tells us that informal contacts are potentially an 
important source of knowledge for the engineers in their daily working lives. Even specific 
knowledge about new products, which is likely to be very firm-specific and which the firms are 
likely to want to protect from competitors, is shared among these engineers.  
Besides exchanging more specific knowledge about their products and technologies, the 
engineers also share more locality-specific information. It might be difficult to place a value on 
such information, but it could have an important function in updating and strengthening the network 
of informal contacts. This is potentially important for the dynamics of a local community, since a 
larger proportion of the engineers who reported that they have social contacts acquired their current 
job through a social network than those without such contacts.  
Certain limitations of this study should be considered in future research. These are important 
relative to the broader questions raised in the literature and in this paper. This study shows that 
social networks and informal communication are diffusing knowledge between firms in a coherent 
group of firms located within in a rather small geographical area. Future research also needs to ask 
the individual in question to compare the value of knowledge thus acquired with other sources of 
information (e.g. colleagues in their workgroup, other colleagues in their firm, the internet, 
university-based research contacts, technical journals or similar sources). This would add to our 
knowledge of how more specific information and knowledge is actually exchanged, within and 
across organizational boundaries. The micro-level study of engineers should still be the unit of 
analysis, since the results may become more biased if the interviews and surveys are conducted at 
the level of the firm. It is impossible for managers to know the full extent, value and usefulness of 
each of their employee’s informal social contacts. 
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This paper provides insights as to the existence and value of informal relationships to the 
individual employee. However, little is known about the value to the firm and the effects of these 
relationships on firm performance. Future surveys linking the inter-firm informal contacts with firm 
performance investigations may provide interesting evidence of how firms are influenced, both 
positively and negatively, by the relations of their employees. The knowledge flowing through 
informal contacts is often considered in a positive light in the literature. The downside of 
information trading, for example the loss of information to competitors, which could potentially 
weaken a firm’s performance, has to date, not received sufficient attention. 
Furthermore, it would be constructive to learn more about how individuals are linked in 
networks of informal relationships across firms. Identifying how networks and epistemic 
communities operate in different sectors and regional levels could shed light on how widely 
knowledge is exchanged through a network. A limitation in the questionnaire used in this paper is 
the anonymity of the engineers. By asking engineers to name, say, their three most important 
informal social contacts in the cluster, it may be possible to map a web of informal contacts and to 
gain a more accurate picture of the extent of the social networks. This important issue is still to be 
addressed in the debate on the importance, characteristics and borders of these networks. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Engineers with at least one informal contact and their acquisition of knowledge 
Question N Yes No Total 
“Do you have informal contact with at least one 
employee in another firm in the cluster?” 3421 76% 24% 100% 
“Do you acquire knowledge through your informal 
contact(s) that you take advantage of in your current 
job?” 2582 41% 59% 100% 
1. This is equal to the total sample excluding four missing observations. Percentages are shares of this number. 
2. This is the number of respondents with at least one informal contact. 
Table 2: Who are engineers in contact with? 
Category 
 
 
Proportion of all engineers with 
at least one informal contact (N=259) 
   
 
Former colleagues 66% 
Classmates 50% 
Private friends 47% 
Others 8% 
Note: The engineers were asked the following question: “Who are you in informal contact with?” They could pick more than one answer to this 
question. 
Table 3: Mobility and informal contact 
N=327 
At least one 
informal contact 
No informal 
contact Total 
Above average number of total job 
changes in career (high mobility) 78% 21% 100% 
Below average number of total job 
changes in career (low mobility) 75% 25% 100% 
Total 76% 24% 100% 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the result is not significant, i.e. there is no significant difference between high and low mobility. 
Table 4: Experiences and acquisition of knowledge 
 
At least one 
informal 
contact 
No informal 
contact 
Acquire 
knowledge 
Does not 
acquire any 
knowledge 
High or 
average 
value  
Low 
Value 
Cluster experience1       
2 years or less  68% 32% 37% 63% 50% 50% 
3 years or more 82% 18% 43% 57% 71% 29% 
Industry experience2       
3 years or less  69% 31% 38% 62% 52% 48% 
4 years or more  82% 18% 43% 57% 72% 28% 
1. Chi-square test reveals that the result is significant at a 1%-level (informal vs. no informal, N=342), is not significant (acquire vs. not acquire, 
N=258) and significant at a 5%-level (high vs. low, N=104). 
2. Chi-square test reveals that the result is significant at a 1%-level (informal vs. no informal, N=342), is not significant (acquire vs. not acquire, 
N=258) and significant at a 5%-level (high vs. low, N=104). 
Note: Generally, these chi-square test shows that there are significant differences between low and high experience for informal vs. no informal 
contacts and for high vs. low value, but the differences are insignificant for acquire vs. not acquire. 
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Table 5: Function in firm and informal contacts? 
 
At least one 
informal 
contact 
No informal 
contact 
Acquire 
knowledge 
Do not acquire 
knowledge 
Research and Development 76% 24% 36% 64% 
Production 53% 47% 56% 44% 
Management 81% 19% 55% 45% 
Total 76% 24% 40% 60% 
Note: Marketing engineers have been removed from this table due to too few observations. Chi-square tests reveal that the result is significant at a 
6%-level for both informal vs. no informal (N=329) and acquire vs. not acquire (N=248). This shows that there are significant differences across job 
functions. 
Table 6: Formal projects
1
 in the past and informal contact 
N=342 
At least one 
informal contact 
No informal 
contact Total 
Formal projects 87% 13% 100% 
No formal projects 73% 27% 100% 
Total 76% 24% 100% 
1. We define a formal project as a cooperative agreement between two or more firms. 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the result is significant at a 2% level, which shows that those who have engaged in formal projects are significantly 
different from those with no experience of formal projects. 
Table 7: Competition clauses and informal contacts 
N=338 At least one informal contact No informal contacts 
Competition clause  63% 37% 
No competition clause 79% 21% 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that the result is significant at a 2% level. Thus, there are significant differences between employees with a competition 
clause and those with no competition clause. 
Table 8: Network and non-network primary channels for information about current job 
N=277 Informal contacts No informal contacts Total 
 
Non-network-related factors1 
 
 
69% 
 
43% 
 
31% 
 
61% 
 
100% 
 
47% 
 
Network-related factors2 
 
 
82% 
 
57% 
 
 
18% 
 
39% 
 
 
100% 
 
53% 
Total 
 
76% 
 
100% 
24% 
 
100% 
- 
 
100% 
1. Non-network-related factors: Internet job databases, job ads, the press, etc. 
2. Network-related factors: Former colleagues, classmates, employees in the new firm, etc. 
Note: Chi-square test reveals that both results are significant at a 1% level. Both informal and non-informal contacts, as well as non-network and 
network-related factors, are significantly different.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Most important job function in the firm 
 
Figure 2: Type of knowledge acquired through informal contact 
 
Note: The engineers were asked the following question: “Which type of knowledge do you acquire through your informal contact(s)?” and were given 
four options: general knowledge, technical knowledge on standard equipment, technical knowledge on new products, and other. The percentages 
reported are the total number of engineers acquiring the particular type of knowledge as a proportion of the total number of engineers who answered 
that he/she acquired knowledge from his/her contacts (104 respondents). Respondents could pick more than one type of knowledge in the 
questionnaire. 
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Figure 3: Value of knowledge acquired through informal contact 
 
Note: The engineers were asked the following question: “How do you rate the value of the knowledge that you receive from your 
informal contact?” and were given three options: high, medium, and low. 
 
 
